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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 16, 2018, Le Dinh Luong (Luong) was put on trial in Vietnam
and sentenced to twenty years in prison under charges of subversion in violation of Article 79 of the 1999 Penal Code.1 A veteran and Catholic activist,
Luong had publicly criticized Formosa Ha Tinh Steel, the Taiwanese corporation responsible for dumping toxic waste into the ocean, which caused a
major marine environmental disaster off Vietnam’s central coast in 2016,2 as
well as the lack of an adequate response from the Vietnamese government.3
He had been targeted by authorities and was taken into custody in July 2017.
It was not until early July 2018, after almost a year of detention without a
family visit, that Luong was granted permission to be represented by a defense
lawyer for his trial scheduled a month later.4 The trial lasted one day with the
judgment based entirely on the testimony of two witnesses for the government, neither of whom were “fit to testify.”5 One of the witnesses later came
forward to recant his testimony, claiming that he was beaten into making the
forced confession.6 However, the court still upheld Luong’s prison sentence.7
Luong was only one of many journalists and activists who were prosecuted
for peaceful protesting or merely criticizing the Vietnamese government. Vietnam is a one-party state ruled by the Communist Party of Vietnam (Dang
Cong San Vietnam, CPV). According to Human Rights Watch, many basic
rights, including freedom of speech and the press, are restricted.8 The state
controls all print and broadcast media, and authorities have actively and

1
Vietnam: Drop Charges Against Environmental Activist, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(July 26, 2018), http://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/26/vietnam-drop-charges-against-envi
ronmental-activist [hereinafter HRW Luong]; Vietnam Sentences Activist to 20 Years
Prison Amid Dissent Crackdown, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2018), https://uk.reuters.com/article/
uk-vietnam-dissident/vietnam-sentences-activist-to-20-years-prison-amid-dissent-crackdo
wn-idUKKBN1L10RD.
2
HRW Luong, supra note 1.
3
Vietnamese Bloggers Gets 20-Year Jail Sentence, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS
(Aug. 16, 2018), http://rsf.org/en/news/vietnamese-blogger-gets-20-year-jail-sentence.
4
The Procuracy granted Luong permission in early July and the trial was scheduled on
July 30. See HRW Luong, supra note 1.
5
Richard Finney, Vietnamese Activist Given 20-Year Term for Seeking Regime “Overthrow”, RADIO FREE ASIA (Aug. 16, 2018), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/overt
hrow-08162018144518.html.
6
Vietnamese Videographer Beaten and Harassed in Prison, COMM. TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS (Aug. 20, 2018), http://cpj.org/2018/08/vietnamese-videographer-beaten-and
-harassed-in-pri.php.
7
Id.
8
Vietnam, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/asia/vietnam (last visited Oct.
12, 2018).
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increasingly silenced journalists and bloggers through arrest, prosecution, and
other means of harassment.9
Article 25 of the Vietnamese Constitution states that citizens “shall enjoy
the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, of access to
information, to assemble, [freedom to] form associations and [freedom to]
hold demonstrations. The practice of these rights shall be provided by the
law.”10 When prosecuting individuals in spite of this constitutional provision,
the government often masks the charges under “flagrant offense” to go around
the Constitution, which requires a decision by a court or prosecutor to arrest
any individual.11 This approach provides the government with vast authority
to arrest and detain persons “for significant periods of time under vague national security provisions of the penal code”12 without judicial process.
Freedom of speech protection is often taken for granted in many Western
countries, for it is always associated with democracy. It is perplexing then,
that a non-democratic country like Vietnam would include this protection in
the law. A scholar has come up with three possible explanations: freedom of
speech assists with “enforcing central authority,” “alleviates pressures for political change[s],” and “lend[s] legitimacy to a government.”13 Considering
the structure of the Vietnamese government and the treatment of peaceful protestors, the explanations seem eerily accurate.
This Note argues that Vietnam needs a more effective system of enforcing
freedom of speech protection given the frequent arrests of activists and bloggers for peaceful protesting and the insufficient remedies available. This is a
long-standing issue that has affected Vietnam in many other ways. However,
implementation efforts may be futile or resisted because the root of the issue
lies at the structure of the government, which is under heavy influence by the
9
A month after Tuoi Tre Online, a local news website in Hanoi, published an article
titled “Vietnamese President agrees on issuing Demonstration Law,” Vietnamese authorities suspended the newspaper for publishing what they deemed “untrue” content. Vo Hai,
Major Online Newspaper Suspended for Three Months in Vietnam, VN EXPRESS INT’L
(July 17, 2018), http://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/major-online-newspaper-suspended-forthree-months-in-vietnam-3778939.html.
10
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 25, translated in
THE CONSTITUTE PROJECT, http://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Socialist_Republ
ic_of_Vietnam_2013.pdf?lang=en (Version: As Amended in 2013 - English). The same
provision was codified under chapter V of the 2001 version. See HIEN PHAP VIETNAM
(2011) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. V, art. 69, translated in WORLD BANK GRP., https://pu
blicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Vietn
am_Constitution_1992_amended%202001_EN.pdf (Version: As Amended in 2001 - English).
11
See HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 20.
12
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VIETNAM 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 6 (2017), https://www.ju
stice.gov/eoir/page/file/1057101/download [hereinafter U.S. STATE REPORT].
13
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Free Speech Without Democracy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59, 60
(2015).
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CPV. Part II of the Note will provide a brief historical background of Vietnam
and an overview of the CPV and the structure of the government to illustrate
this influence. Then Part II will then look at some case studies involving
peaceful protests, as well as the government’s reactions and its treatment of
detained protestors. Finally, Part II will conclude by discussing the legal background and the legitimacy of the arrests.
Part III will identify possible remedies available for the protestors after
they are detained. In particular, Part III will analyze whether or not the remedies are adequate or effective. Part IV of the Note will discuss the global impact of the lack of effective freedom of speech protection in Vietnam and the
international responses considering that Vietnam is a member of the United
Nations. Part V will advance proposals for certain changes and implementations, based on the legal structure in Vietnam and the global pressure, in order
to better safeguard and enforce freedom of speech protection. Ultimately, the
Note will conclude that, because of the rigidity of the government and the
CPV’s pervasive influence, many of these measures will be ineffective or impossible to implement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background and the Government’s Structure
Vietnam declared its independence on September 2, 1945,14 but the French
were still seeking to re-establish their control of the country. Following World
War II, French troops landed in Saigon under the pretense of helping the British “disarm the Japanese,” while in fact, two years later, instigating a war that
lasted until 1954.15 After fighting off the French, Vietnam had to carry out
another war against the United States until 1975.16 At the heart of the conflict
during the Vietnam War, or as it is called in Vietnam the “War Against the
Americans to Save the Nation” (Chiến Tranh Chống Mỹ Cứu Nước),17 was
North Vietnam’s desire “to unify the entire country under a single communist
regime modeled after those of the Soviet Union and China.”18 By the end of
14
Anh Luu, Vietnam Legal Research, GLOBALEX (July 2006), http://www.nyulawglobal
.org/globalex/Vietnam.html.
15
Andrew L. Odell & Marlene F. Castillo, Vietnam in a Nutshell: A Historical, Political
and Commercial Overview, 21 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 82, 83–84 (2008).
16
Id. at 83.
17
Tim Nash, Vietnam War Summary, FINER TIMES (Nov. 2, 2008), https://www.thefinert
imes.com/summery-of-vietnam-war.
18
Ronald H. Spector, Vietnam War, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Vi
etnam-War (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). The Geneva Accord in 1954 temporarily divided
the country into two parts with separate administrations, pending an election scheduled in
1956: the northern part is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the southern part is the
Republic of Vietnam. See Claude Rohwer, Progress and Problems in Vietnam’s
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the war in 1975, the north prevailed and the unified country was later renamed
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.19
To understand the reasons for the peaceful protests and arrests of the activists, it is necessary to look at Vietnamese government and political structure. As the name suggests, Vietnam has a socialist regime and is one of the
few remaining countries where the Communist Party is dominant.20 The Constitution states that the CPV “is the leading force of the State and society.”21
While only a political organization and not part of the State’s institution, the
CPV has a central role in the government as well as in the social and legal
system in Vietnam.22 It has a close relation to the government and influences
the government through the “election . . . of the National Assembly (Quốc hội
similar to Congress in the U.S.), the operation of the administration, and the
function of the judicial system.”23 On a day-to-day basis, the Political Bureau
(Politburo) and the Central Committee of the CPV exert their influence by
proposing legislation and regulations.24 Then, every five years, the Party holds
a national congress to “outline the country’s overall direction and future
course as well as to formalize policies.”25
Under Article 69 of the Constitution, the National Assembly, a 498-member committee,26 is the highest state organization and possesses a wide range
of constitutional and legislative powers.27 “The Supreme People’s Court, [the
Supreme People’s Procuracy], and the Government are all on equal constitutional footing just below the National Assembly,”28 which has authority to
monitor these institutions29 as well as to appoint their heads.30 The National
Committee and the Standing Committee (which is empowered to act on behalf
of the Assembly) are constitutionally the most important bodies in the government, and both operate on the principle of “democratic centralism.”31 This
principle limits the debates and decision-making within the bounds
Development of Commercial Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 275, 276 (1997); see also Luu,
supra note 14.
19
Luu, supra note 14.
20
Odell & Castillo, supra note 15, at 85.
21
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. I, art. 4.
22
Luu, supra note 14.
23
Id.
24
Brian J.M. Quinn, Legal Reform and Its Context in Vietnam, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
219, 225 (2002).
25
Government Structure, EMBASSY OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET., http://vietnam
embassy-usa.org/vietnam/politics/government-structure (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
26
Id.
27
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. V, art. 69.
28
Quinn, supra note 24, at 226.
29
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. V, art. 70, cl. 2.
30
Id. at cl. 7.
31
HPVN (2001) ch. I, art. 6. The language is removed in the 2013 amendment. See HIEN
PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. I, art. 6.

808

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 48:803

established at the central level, effectively prohibiting matters not on the
agenda.32 Under this regime “all questions before the National Assembly must
originate from the Standing Committee” which receives its direction from the
Politburo.33 This system “guarantees that the [CPV] can maintain firm control
over the agenda [and policy setting].”34
The judicial branch is similarly under heavy influence from the CPV. First
off, judges are appointed and subject to a five-year term, same as the National
Assembly,35 and the requirements “remain to protect ‘socialist legality’ and
‘the socialist regime’ (by nodding in the direction of prevailing Party policies)
and to answer to political bodies.”36 Phung Van Tuu, Vice-Chairman of the
National Assembly, publicly advocated for CPV’s leadership over judicial
agencies in policy making, trial, and the assignment of cadres, and he stated
that judicial independence “[did] not mean the separation from the Party’s
leadership.”37 As a result, judges are very sensitive towards the possibility of
reacquiring their positions, and in particular, “‘uncooperative’ judges can find
themselves without an appointment at the end of their five-year term.”38 In
addition, the judges need to petition for reappointment to the Judge Selection
Council, which is comprised of representatives from various government departments.39 This setup incentivizes judges to “[lobby] among [members]
from other organizations . . . for their reappointment”40 and likely cater to the
government opinion in cases of political interest. Given the role of the CPV,
the government places a high priority in protecting the Party’s image. As
shown in the section below, any actions or statements criticizing the Party or
the government’s conduct are often met with harsh punishment, such as detention, arrest, or long-term imprisonment.
B. Case Studies: Arbitrary Arrests of Peaceful Protestors
In response to the perceived corruption of the government and many injustices, a large number of citizens have engaged in peaceful protesting and
demonstrations. Nguyen Huu Vinh (also known as Anh Ba Sàm), after leaving
32

Quinn, supra note 24, at 226 n.14.
Id.
34
Id. at 226.
35
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII, art. 105, cl. 1.
36
PER BERGLING, LEGAL REFORM AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE THE VIETNAMESE
EXPERIENCE 140 (Umea Universitet 1999).
37
Id.
38
Quinn, supra note 24, at 240.
39
Dinh Thanh Phuong & Nguyen Thi Hang Diem Mi, Revised Law on Courts: Why
Term of Office of Judges Should Be Extended, VIET. L. & LEGAL F. (Sept. 26, 2014),
http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/revised-law-on-courts-why-term-of-office-of-judges-shoul
d-be-extended-3971.html [hereinafter Revised Law on Courts].
40
Id.
33
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the police force in the Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi, started writing
several blogs regarding social, political, economic, and cultural issues in Vietnam.41 He was detained in May 2014, held in prison throughout 2015, then
put on trial in March 2016 for “abusing rights to freedom and democracy to
infringe upon the interests of the state.”42 He was then sentenced to five years
in prison.43 The judge held that the articles that he had written presented a
pessimistic view and negatively affected people’s confidence in the CPV,
which “[went] against the interests of the nation.”44 Similarly, Nguyen Ngoc
Nhu Quynh, a blogger under the pen name “Mother Mushroom” (Mẹ Nấm),
was arrested on similar charges.45 She wrote on social and political issues,
including land confiscation and investigation on deaths of suspects in police
custody, and she had participated in numerous public protests regarding the
environment and human rights.46
The U.S. State Department reported that in 2017, the government arrested
for peaceful protesting some “30 individuals . . . includ[ing] members of the
pro-democracy group[s] . . . , and those involved in expressing dissent or organizing demonstrations related to the 2016 industrial spill by the Taiwaneseowned Formosa Ha Tinh Steel[.]”47 For instance, in a footage of the fishermen
march to file a lawsuit against the Formosa, activist Hoang Duc Binh narrated
that the fishermen were stopped and beaten by authorities.48 He was arrested,
and at trial, denied committing any crime because what he said was true.49
The court, however, deemed the comments “untrue” and slanderous toward
authorities and sentenced the activist to fourteen years in prison.50 As mentioned above, activist Le Dinh Luong was also arrested for his involvement in
similar protests and was given a twenty-year sentence.
The best-case scenario for a detained journalist is the revocation of press
credentials and fines for publishing harmful materials to national interests if
41

Editorial Board, Free Speech Is Under Siege in Vietnam, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/free-speech-under-siege-in-vietnam/2016/04/2
1/76ee3c94-fb5a-11e5-9140-e61d062438bb_story.html?.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Vietnam: Drop Charges Against “Mother Mushroom”, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov.
30, 2017), http://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/30/vietnam-drop-charges-against-mother-m
ushroom [hereinafter HRW Mother Mushroom].
46
Id.; see also CPJ Awardee “Mother Mushroom” Faces Threats, Poor Prison Conditions, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (July 3, 2018), http://cpj.org/2018/07/cpj-awardeemother-mushroom-faces-threats-poor-pri.php.
47
U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6.
48
Vietnam Jails Environmental Blogger for 14 Years, VOA NEWS (Feb. 6, 2018), http://
www.voanews.com/a/vietnam-jails-activist-for-livestreaming-pollution-march/4240930.h
tml.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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such violations “are not serious enough for criminal proceedings.”51 More often than not, the protestors are merely bloggers and activists, and what awaits
them is a short, unfair trial following a lengthy period of detention without
any contact or representation by counsel. Case in point, lawyer Nguyen Van
Dai, founder of Brotherhood for Democracy, a group aiming to defend human
rights and promote democracy in Vietnam, was arrested in December 2015
for producing anti-state propaganda.52 It was not until December 2017 that he
was assigned an attorney, who was not one his family had chosen, and in fact,
the three lawyers selected by his family “had not been permitted to meet with
Dai during his twenty-four months of pretrial detention.”53
Worse yet, some do not even make it to the court room. Nguyen Huu Tan,
a Hoa Hao Buddhist follower charged with distributing anti-state documents,
died while in police custody.54 The authorities, after a questionable investigation, announced that he committed suicide, even with evidence that indicated
otherwise.55 In another incident, land rights activist Trần Thị Thúy continued
to be denied medical treatment for her tumor and open wound “unless she
‘confess[ed]’ to the crimes for which she was convicted.”56
Given the dire state of the arrests and subsequent treatment of detainees,
several important questions arise. First, were those arrests legitimate? Put another way, did the government have a valid legal basis to imprison the activists? Next, how can a detainee navigate the court system? How the courts work
and what remedies are available is information not often readily accessible,
and even when it is a discrepancy exists between the “law on paper” and the
“law in reality.”57 The legal system in Vietnam allows all three branches (legislature, judiciary, executive) to produce legislation, predictably engendering
“the inherent problem of a jungle of regulations, which is both inconsistent
and fragmented.”58 Furthermore, when faced with unfamiliar cases, instead of
trying to construe the language of the statutes, judges often defer to and seek

51

U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 18.
Nguyen Van Dai: Vietnam Jails Activist Lawyer and Five Others, BBC (Apr. 5, 2018),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43659830.
53
U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 10.
54
Joshua Lipes, Family of Vietnam Hoa Hao Buddhist Questions Death in Custody
Ruled Suicide, RADIO FREE ASIA (May 4, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/
suicide-05042017153429.html.
55
See id. (raising doubts based on the extent of the injuries, the blurry CCTV video, and
the prison uniform).
56
Urgent Action: Growing Health Fears for Prisoner of Conscience, AI Index ASA
41/5727/2017 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA4157
272017ENGLISH.pdf [hereinafter Urgent Action].
57
Quinn, supra note 24, at 222.
58
Bui Thi Bich Lien, Legal Interpretation and the Vietnamese Version of the Rule of
Law, 6 NAT’L TAIWAN UNIV. L. REV. 321, 326 (2011), http://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/ntulawre
view/articles/6-1/11-Article-Bui%20Thi%20Bich%20Lien_p321-337.pdf.
52
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an informal opinion from the government.59 Such an interpretation is unreliable when the government has “an obvious stake in the outcome.”60 The vague
language used in the law on paper, coupled with the courts’ deference to the
government, has left great discretion to the local officials and other enforcement agencies.
C. Legal Background and the Legitimacy of the Arrests
Before discussing the legitimacy of the arrests, it is helpful to first look at
the Constitution of Vietnam. Throughout history, Vietnam has changed and
adopted four versions of its constitution in 1946, 1959, 1980, and 1992.61
Since then, any revisions have been incorporated directly into the constitution,
with the latest being the 2013 amendments. On the surface, the revision process seemed inclusive with the creation of a Constitutional Drafting Committee, which gathered millions of citizens’ comments on the first draft and held
public gatherings and discussions.62 The result, however, largely reflected a
disregard for the public voice and instead reinforced the role of the CPV.63
The freedom of speech protection is listed in Chapter II of the constitution,
which enumerates the citizens’ fundamental rights.64 Under Article 25, citizens are entitled to “the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of
the press, . . . [and t]he practice of these rights shall be provided by the law.”65
The basic premise is substantively the same as in the previous revision. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note two major modifications. First, this protection
was put under Chapter V, titled “Basic Rights and Obligations of Citizens” in
the 2001 amendment, whereas the entire section was moved to Chapter II,
which was renamed “Human Rights and Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and
Duties” in the 2013 amendment.66 This change suggests the government’s
recognition of the inherent nature of these rights as applicable to everyone
present in the country, not just exclusive to Vietnamese people with valid citizenship status. It also suggests placing a stronger emphasis on establishing
59

Quinn, supra note 24, at 240.
Id. at 240–41.
61
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], pmbl.
62
Rodion Ebbighausen, Vietnam’s New Constitution Shows Limits of Reform, DW
NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.dw.com/en/vietnams-new-constitution-shows-limits-of-r
eform/a-17344033.
63
Compare HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2001) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], art IV (stating that
only the CPV is the vanguard of the working class), with HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013)
[HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], art. IV (adding “simultaneously the vanguard of labourers and
of the Vietnamese nation”).
64
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 25.
65
Id.
66
HPVN (2001) ch. V, art. 69; HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION],
ch. II, art. 25.
60
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legal protection. This argument is bolstered by the distinct uses of “citizens,”
“all citizens,” “everyone,” “no one,” as contrasted with “Vietnamese citizen[s].”67 The second major change was the implementation of Article 14,
clause 2, which expressly restricts human rights and citizen’s rights “in imperative circumstances for the reasons of national defense, national security,
social order and security, social morality and community well-being.”68 Since
there is no qualification in scope such as “subject to” or “limited to” a certain
provision, this Article has a broad application to all other Articles, essentially
giving the authorities the ability to override the constitutional guarantees of
human rights when the situation fits the exception.69
There are two immediate issues. First, on what basis will the circumstances
be evaluated as “imperative”70 for the purpose of this Article, given the broad
range of possible violations? Second, what is the process if the circumstances
are determined to be “imperative”?71 For the first issue, an average person
may be able to perceive the threshold over which conduct would impose upon
national security and national defense. In fact, most everyday acts or speeches
are not likely to pose such a threat. However, in the presence of vague terms
such as “social morality” and “community well-being” it becomes problematic to safeguard against a possible arbitrary standard. As professor Quynh Thi
Nhu Nguyen has pointed out, Vietnamese value systems are affected by five
main values layers,72 and even the government is “confused and trapped with
vast issues such as what, how and why particular values should be promoted.”73 There is also little guidance from the legislature. Unlike in many
other countries such as the United States, where the Constitution only enumerates a small number of provisions to set a foundation, the Vietnamese
Constitution has over one hundred articles attempting to address all issues,
inevitably creating confusion in applying the law. Moreover, Vietnam is a
civil law jurisdiction and the doctrine of precedents has not been accepted.74
Court opinions are very short and not written in detail and not publicly published, which makes it hard to “follow the legal reasoning that prevailed in the
judgment.”75

67

See HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 15–17, 19–20.
Id. at ch. II, art. 14, cl. 2.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Quynh Thi Nhu Nguyen, The Vietnamese Values System: A Blend of Oriental, Western and Socialist Values, 9 INT’L EDUC. STUD. 32, 34 (2016).
73
Id. at 32.
74
Andrea Anderson, Judicial Independence and the Vietnamese Courts 35 (Mar. 2012)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Lund University), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=dow
nloadFile&recordOId=2760334&fileOId=3129618.
75
Id.
68
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With the likelihood that the constitutional protection for freedom of speech
may be easily curtailed, the second issue regarding the process arises. Article
20 of the constitution requires a decision by the People’s Court or a decision
or sanction of the People’s Procuracy (equivalent to a warrant) before an arrest
can be made.76 However, as is the case in other articles, the constitution also
allows an exception here whereby a decision by the court or procuracy office
is waived if the alleged wrongdoing is a “flagrant offense.”77 Again, the law
fails to provide any guidance or instruction as to what kind of conduct would
amount to a flagrant offense and instead leaves the interpretation of the terms
entirely up to the police who have the discretion to make a snap judgment at
the scene.78 Possibly to avoid potential contest regarding charges that might
seem less serious to qualify as “flagrant,” the government often resorts to
Chapter XI of the Vietnam Penal Code, which provides for crimes of “infringing upon national security.”79 In particular, the accusations are likely under
Article 79 for activities “aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration”
or Article 88 for “propaganda against the [state].”80 Both of these charges
carry severe prison punishment, but require little particularized factual allegations.81 Either of these two Articles is used in tandem with, or often subsequent to, charges under Article 258 of the Penal Code for “[a]busing democratic freedom to infringe upon the interests of the state.”82 This upgrade in
charges could subject a convicted individual to an additional seven years in
prison, since a judgment under Article 79 or 88 would guarantee that the offense satisfies the “serious circumstances” test in Article 258.83
76

HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 20, cl. 2.
Id.
78
See infra discussion in pt. III on contesting the legitimacy of arrests.
79
LUAT HINH SU VIETNAM [PEN. C.], No. 15/1999/QH10, ch. XI, translated in WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.: VIET., http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/vn/vn/vn01
7en.pdf (Version: 1999 – English).
80
Those found guilty of carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the People’s administration are sentenced to at least twelve years in prison, in some cases even life imprisonment or death. See id. at art. 79, cl. 1. Those convicted of conducting propaganda against
the state could be sentenced up to twelve years in prison, or up to twenty years in “particularly serious crimes.” See id. at art. 8, 80.
81
A twenty-four-year-old student was arrested and charged with propaganda against the
state merely for posting anti-corruption blogs aimed at government leaders. See Richard
Finney, Vietnamese Blogger Phan Kim Khanh Given Six-Year Prison Term, RADIO FREE
ASIA (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/blogger-10252017154340.
html.
82
PEN. C., ch. XX, art. 258; see Joshua Lipes, Vietnam Jails Activist Blogger for Seven
Years Over Formosa Protests, RADIO FREE ASIA (Nov. 27, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/engli
sh/news/vietnam/blogger-11272017160528.html (describing that the activist blogger was
initially arrested under Article 258 of the Penal Code, but the charges were later upgraded
to the more severe Article 88).
83
See PEN. C., ch. XX, art. 258, cl. 2 (increasing the prison sentence to between two and
seven years in serious circumstances).
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The laws of Vietnam provide protection for freedom of speech and at the
same time create various tools to pierce that protection. They describe the
process and procedure for arresting a suspected wrongdoer and simultaneously include provisions to dispense with the warrant requirements. The arrests of the peaceful protestors are constitutionally permissible, yet susceptible to abuse. The vague language used, coupled with virtually no guidance in
legal interpretation, has allowed the police and the government at large, wide
latitude to construe the law to serve their needs. What results is the legal protection for the government’s action at the expense of the people.
III. ANALYSIS: ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES
This part of the Note will attempt to answer the critical question of whether
the currently available remedies for protestors who have been arrested and
detained are adequate or effective. The analysis will start with contesting the
legitimacy of the arrests to the Prosecutor’s office and to the courts. Then, this
part will examine the court system, the trials, the roles of judges and jurors,
and the influence of the CPV on the effectiveness of trials.
The first remedy is prosecutor review of the arrests. The terms of the constitution grant the Supreme People’s Procuracy of Vietnam (Viện kiểm sát
nhân dân tối cao, a national-level public prosecutor’s office) authority to review actions taken by the police force,84 including allegations of abuse. In
essence, the Procuracy acts as a check to the police’s power in case of improper arrest and is fully authorized to order the release of the detainee. For
instance, the police could make an arrest in urgent circumstances, such as
when a person almost committed a crime or was in the process of conducting
the act, and the Procuracy has twelve hours to issue a decision whether or not
to approve such arrest.85 Additionally, a decision to initiate a formal criminal
investigation must be issued within three days of the arrest, with the possibility of extending to six days in total, otherwise the police must release the suspect immediately.86 In theory, this power check is effective because it works
to discourage police from skipping steps in the process, risking a reversal decision from the People’s Procuracy, and potential criminal liability.87

84
See HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII, art. 107, cl. 3 (prescribing the responsibility of the People’s Procuracy as including the protection of human
rights, citizen’s rights, and “ensuring that laws are strictly and uniformly observed.”).
85
See LUAT TO TUNG HINH SU VIETNAM [C. CRIM. PRO.], No. 19/2003QH11, art. 86–
87, translated in THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), http://www.oecd.
org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/46817432.pdf (Version: As Amended in 2003 –
English).
86
Id. at art. 87 (“[T]he custody decision issuers may extend the custody time limit but
for no more than three days.”).
87
See PEN. C., ch. XIII, art. 123 (subjecting those who make illegal arrests to warning,
non-custodial reform, or even imprisonment of up to two years).
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However, in reality police operate with little transparency and “sometimes act
with impunity.”88 The vague language problem in the Constitution and Penal
Code gives the People’s Procuracy no reliable basis to evaluate the arrest,
which in turn effectively rids the detainee of another layer of protection. Furthermore, even though Articles 119 and 120 of the Criminal Procedure Code
limit the time for criminal investigation and temporary detention to two
months for lesser offenses, they allow four months for “especially serious offenses,” with the possibility of extending to four months for three more
times.89 Authorities have routinely requested extensions with the purpose of
punishing and pressuring the protestors to confess to the crimes.90 This effectively translates, for a peaceful protestor who has been charged under Penal
Code Article 79 or 88,91 to pretrial detention of up to sixteen months pending
investigation.92 In fact, this period could even be longer if a protestor has been
charged with multiple violations since the Code does not preclude the plausible interpretation that such time limit applies to each charge separately.93
The second remedy comes in the form of judicial review, but contesting
the basis of an arrest or lengthy detention before a court is also futile. While
the law provides a detainee the right to counsel from the time of their detention,94 in practice authorities could use bureaucratic tactics to delay such access, many times until shortly before the case goes to trial, leaving the counsel
inadequate time to prepare.95 Under most circumstances, the detainees are responsible for obtaining their own attorney, except in the case of minors or
people with mental disabilities,96 and for paying all legal costs.97 The problem
is exacerbated because once at trial, it is likely that the only issue argued is
the criminality of the detainee’s conduct, not the legality of the government’s
action.98 Since the defense attorney does not challenge the government’s action, possibly due to lack of time and preparation, among other reasons, the
88

U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
C. CRIM. PRO., art. 119, cl. 2; art.120, cl. 2.
90
See Urgent Action, supra note 56.
91
Article 79 proscribes activities that are aimed at overthrowing the People’s administration and Article 88 prohibits activities that constitute propaganda against the state. PEN.
C., art. 79, 88. These allegations are likely bound up in “especially serious offense” category.
92
The language in both articles—“the investigation time limit may be extended three
times, for no more than four months each”—afford twelve more months in addition to the
original four months. See C. CRIM. PRO., art. 119–20.
93
This is a possible explanation, as the State Department has reported that individuals
could be detained pending investigation for up to twenty-four months. U.S. STATE REPORT,
supra note 12, at 8.
94
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 31, cl. 4.
95
See supra text accompanying note 4.
96
C. CRIM. PRO., ch. IV, art. 57.
97
Id. at ch. VII, art. 99.
98
See Anderson, supra note 74.
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damages afforded by the Constitution for arrest and detention “in violation of
the law”99 fail to serve their function. The detainee’s ability to challenge the
lawfulness of the arrest or detention before a court, which extends to the ability to seek compensation from such injustice, is hampered by the government’s maneuvers that are not prohibited by law. Thus, once again, the inconsistency of Vietnamese law manifests itself: a constitutional protection and
remedy is readily available on paper but illusory in practice.
Since contesting the legitimacy of an arrest is not a feasible option, the
detained protestors could seek remedies at trial. Like many countries, Vietnam
also recognizes the right to a fair and public trial.100 A judge panel (the bench)
is set up for each trial, consisting of one judge and two people’s jurors (also
called people’s assessors),101 who are constitutionally required to assess the
case independently from each other “and shall only obey the law.”102 The
unique feature of the Vietnamese trial system is that when considering a case,
judges and jurors are “equal in [the] right to inquire, argue and vote in public,”
and this three-member bench renders decisions “by [the] majority of votes.”103
On its face, this system is democratic. After all, judges are appointed public
servants, and jurors, who are designated by the People’s Council,104 are the
representatives of the lay people. Majority rule has also been well established
as a fundamental principle of democracy.105 Nonetheless, in reality, the system does not work as intended. The people’s jurors lack adequate legal training to perform their roles of “assist[ing] judges to reach a decision that reflect[s] the will of the people.”106 In common law jurisdictions, jurors are often
referred to as “factfinders” or “triers of fact” in a jury trial because they hear
testimonies and make a ruling on factual issues.107 Only the judges answer
questions of law.108 Therefore, jurors can be selected from a pool of lay people, none of whom is required to have any legal knowledge. In contrast, the
people’s jurors in the Vietnamese legal system must make a determination on
both questions of facts and questions of law, under the dual requirements of
99

The constitution provides that any person who has been arrested, held in custody, or
sent to jail in violation of the law shall be entitled to damages for injuries to his or her
person and reputation. HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art.
31, cl. 5.
100
Id. at ch. VIII, art. 103.
101
Nguyen Nien, The Principle of Trial Independence in Vietnam Court, ASEAN LAW
ASS’N, http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/docs/w1_vietnam.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2018).
102
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII, art. 103.
103
Nguyen, supra note 101.
104
Id. at 1.
105
Majority Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
106
Penelope Nicholson, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: The Vietnam Court
Experience, 3 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 37, 43 (2001).
107
Fact-Finder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
108
Trial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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“independence” and “abidance by law only,” set forth in the Constitution.109
Given this higher demand of responsibilities, the Standing Committee of National Assembly has established the standards for selection of the people’s
jurors in the 2002 Ordinance on Judges and Jurors (The Ordinance), which
require “Vietnamese citizens, who are loyal to the Fatherland and the Constitution . . . have good moral qualities, are incorrupt and honest, have legal
knowledge, have the spirit to resolutely protect the socialist legal system, resolutely protect the interest of the State, the legitimate rights and interests of
citizens . . . .”110 The Ordinance merely mentions “legal knowledge” without
specifying any particular qualifications such as a bachelor degree in law or
training in the field, which are prerequisites for a judge.111 In fact, the people’s
jurors “do not have to be law graduates”112 or have to show any pertinent legal
training. There is no transparent assessment for possession of legal
knowledge, and this potential “lack of skills has been the subject of debate in
Vietnam, with some lawyers calling for the abolition of the assessors.”113
Moreover, even judges are not always in the best position to answer or
explain questions of law. First, there are still concerns regarding the sufficiency of the judges’ education and training. While the Ordinance indeed lists
more stringent requirements for selection of judges, including a law degree,
practical work experience,114 and endorsement by the Judge Selection Committee,115 these criteria are not applied consistently, if at all. As legal teachings
only gained prominence in 1979, there is a shortage of qualified law graduates
“clamoring to be judges,”116 which in turn has forced the State to “relax its
requirements.”117 Specifically, following the passage of the 2002 Ordinance,

109
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. VIII, art. 103, cl. 2; see
Tran Duy Binh, The Principle of Independence and Abidance by Law During Trial, VIET.
L. & LEGAL FOR. (June 29, 2012), http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/the-principle-of-indepen
dence-and-abidance-by-law-during-trial-3999.html.
110
PHÁP LỆNH VỀ THẨM PHÁN VÀ HỘI THẨM TOÀ ÁN NHÂN DÂN [ORDINANCE ON JUDGES
AND JURORS OF THE PEOPLE’S COURTS], No. 02/2002/PL-UBTVQH11, art. 5 cl. 2, translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE NORMATIVE LEGAL DOCUMENTS, http://moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/l
ists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=9858 (Version: As Amended in
2002) [hereinafter ORDINANCE].
111
Id. at art. 5.
112
Nicholson, supra note 106, at 44.
113
Id.
114
ORDINANCE, supra note 110, at art. 5.
115
Nicholson, supra note 106, at 43.
116
Id. at 44. Another consequence following this shortage of qualified judges is the “reluctance on the part of the Vietnamese lawmakers to draft laws that leave any discretion to
the courts.” Rohwer, supra note 18, at 280.
117
Penelope Nicholson & Nguyen Hung Quang, The Vietnamese Judiciary: The Politics
of Appointment and Promotion, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 9 (2005), https://digital.law.w
ashington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/659/14PacRimLPolyJ001.pdf?sequen
ce=1&isAllowed=y [hereinafter Nicholson, Politics of Appointment].
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the Standing Committee passed Resolution No. 131, explaining that although
the law degree requirement “should be mandatory,” it would be “some time
before this ideal can be met.”118 Thus, many judges, classified as “owing a
‘legal knowledge debt’ (no kien thuc phap ly),”119 typically have only acquired
certificates in law and continued to receive training, which “occurs once [they
have] been appointed.”120 To repay this “debt,” the judges take classes offered
by licensed attorneys, inherently creating a conflict of interest when such lawyers appear before them in court.121 Second, as discussed above, when faced
with a novel or uncertain issue, judges often defer to the government for interpretation on questions of law.122 In cases in which the government has a
stake, such as the arrests and detention of protestors, this approach effectively
skews the outcome in favor of the government.
Finally, both the judges and the jurors are under immense influence from
the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), a political organization created under
the constitution, and from the CPV by extension.123 Since the selection requirements for judges and jurors include “good moral qualities” and “spirit to
resolutely protect the socialist legal system,”124 the VFF, which “represents
and protects [the] legal and legitimate rights . . . of the people,”125 takes up the
responsibilities of vetting the candidates. The people’s jurors for the Supreme
People’s Court are appointed by the Standing Committee based on recommendations from the VFF, while those for District and provincial levels are
appointed by “the local equivalent of people’s council that act on the recommendation of the [VFF] at the local level.”126 For judges, the Party influence
is structured implicitly within the appointment process, as discussed above.127
In addition, the traditional endorsement by the Party used to come in the form
of “an ‘opinion letter from the Communist Party cell’ (y kien cua cap uy).”128
While the law no longer expressly demands such endorsement, the courts nevertheless continue to seek those letters as a form of “assurance” so that the
118

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
120
Nicholson, supra note 106, at 44.
121
Id.
122
See Bui, supra note 58, at 330–31.
123
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. I, art. 9; See also LUAT
2015 MAT TRAN TO QUOC VIETNAM [THE 2015 LAW ON THE VIETNAM FATHERLAND
FRONT], No. 75/2015/QH13, art. 1, translated in VIET. LAW & LEGAL FORUM, http://vietna
mlawmagazine.vn/the-2015-law-on-the-vietnam-fatherland-front-4931.html (describing
that the Vietnam Fatherland Front was founded and led by the Communist Party of Vietnam). Thus, the CPV could indirectly exert its influence via the Vietnam Fatherland
Front.
124
ORDINANCE, supra note 110, at art. 5.
125
HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch. I, art. 9.
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Nicholson, supra note 106, at 43.
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See supra discussion in pt. II immediately preceding sec. B.
128
Nicholson, Politics of Appointment, supra note 117, at 14 (footnote omitted).
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“Party oversight over judicial appointments remains intact.”129 As a result, it
is rare for non-Party members to become judges. In fact, around ninety percent
of the judges are CPV members, owing responsibilities to the party “above
any duty to the development of the law.”130 A Vietnamese attorney has said
that the independence principle promulgated by the constitution “do[es] not
mean detachment from the Party’s line and policies,” and that “an independent
trial does not mean that trial is not subject to supervision.”131 Put in the context
of the protestors being arrested and detained for alleged wrongful conducts
against the State, and against the CPV, the independent trial structure serves
more form than function.
In addition, the Vietnamese courts use an inquisitorial system where the
judge takes on the role of asking questions, ascertaining facts, and even “framing outcomes as to reconcile litigants’ claims with state interests[.]”132 The
defense attorneys, therefore, play a very limited role and are usually under
severe time constraints to prepare for trial.133 In the trial involving the arrest
and detention of peaceful protestors, judges even “occasionally [silence] defense lawyers who [are] making arguments on behalf of their clients.”134
Moreover, the Criminal Procedure provision that provides the defendants with
the ability to cross examine witnesses135 may often be of little use. The litigation procedure in Vietnam lacks disclosure and discovery requirements, leaving the defense counsel in the dark as to “which witnesses would be called.”136
The law also allows the court, at its discretion, to use an absent witness’s prior
statements that were given to the investigating authorities.137 Unlike in the
United States, cross-examination is merely a privilege and not a constitutional
right that is guaranteed in Vietnamese courts.138 This practice raises various
concerns regarding the authenticity of evidence and whether the statement

129

Id.
Id. at 15.
131
Tran, supra note 109.
132
Bui, supra note 58, at 331.
133
See supra text accompanying note 4; see also HRW Mother Mushroom, supra note
45 (raising concern that the defense lawyer was disbarred four days before the trial); Joshua
Lipes, Vietnam Upholds Decade-Long Jail Term for Activist Blogger Mother Mushroom,
RADIO FREE ASIA (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/appeal-1130
2017162232.html (noting that the defendant’s mother and supporters were all refused entry
to the courtroom).
134
U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 12.
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C. CRIM. PRO., ch. XX, art. 211, cl. 2.
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U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 12.
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C. CRIM. PRO., ch. XVIII, art. 192.
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Compare C. CRIM. PRO., ch. XX, art. 211, cl. 2 (“[D]efense counsels . . . may further
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should be admissible; this Note, however, does not dive deeper into these issues.
There are yet many other factors about the court that weigh heavily against
the detainees in these cases. The low starting salary, coupled with the structured increase based on time spent in office,139 renders judges susceptible to
corruption. As an author has pointed out, it is common for “those involved in
litigation to approach the court to explain the details of their case before it is
actually heard.”140 It is also “not unusual for judges to be offered a fee linked
to the outcome of a particular case.”141 These cases in which protestors have
been arrested and detained under Article 79 or 88 certainly fall squarely within
this category. In the eyes of the public, the court acts as “an arbiter of contentious issues that is alert to the public’s attitude.”142 Thus, the supervision under
which courts normally operate becomes scrutiny from the CPV, and the
Party’s influence becomes even more pronounced. The state-controlled press
can “bring substantial pressure on the courts to decide cases in a particular
way.”143
A scholar has observed that many people believe “the [mere] fact that a
court decides to hear a case is in itself an expression of its consent to the views
of the procuracy, and that it is a foregone conclusion that the case constitutes
a crime.”144 In the rare circumstances that the verdict is not what the government has expected, presumably because it is not harsh enough,145 the procuracies reserve the right to protest against such judgments,146 undoubtedly raising some concerns regarding judicial independence. The defendants also have
the constitutionally guaranteed ability to appeal,147 but such appeals are “done
on the record without argument.”148 In the two-tier system in Vietnam, if the
appellate court affirms the lower court’s ruling, the verdict takes effect immediately,149 although the dissatisfied defendant can petition for review to the
Judges’ Council of the Supreme People’s Court (Uy Ban Tham Phan Toa An
139

Nicholson, Politics of Appointment, supra note 117, at 23, 25.
Nicholson, supra note 106, at 48–49.
141
Id. at 48.
142
Id. at 46.
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Vu Cong Giao & Joel Ng, The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, RULE OF LAW FOR
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280, 294 (2015), http://hrrca.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/11.-ROL-English-Vietnam.
pdf.
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Nguyen, supra note 101, at 6.
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C. CRIM. PRO., ch. XXIII, art. 232.
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Id. at art. 231; see also HIEN PHAP VIETNAM (2013) [HPVN] [CONSTITUTION], ch.
VIII, art. 103, cl. 6.
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Quinn, supra note 24, at 229.
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FREE ASIA (May 26, 2017), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/appeal-0526201713
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Nhan Dan Cap Cao).150 The Council only grants petitions on a discretionary
basis.151 As expected, it is unlikely that the Council will review decisions involving charges under the national security umbrella, and even in the hypothetical scenario that it does, rulings on such sensitive matters are “extremely
difficult to overturn.”152 In other words, sentences by the trial court imposed
upon a peaceful protestor who has been charged under Article 79 or 88 are, in
virtually all cases, the final verdict.
To most people in any jurisdiction, navigating the legal maze is often an
already complicated task. For a peaceful protestor in Vietnam who has been
arrested and detained, that task is generally an impossible mission. The police
enjoy wide discretion afforded by the vague language used in the law to justify
their arbitrary arrests of the protestors under the broad national security
charges. Once the arrest has been made, the government enjoys a vast selection of loopholes and bureaucratic tactics to exploit, including isolating the
detainees for extended periods of time and delaying access to counsel. Throw
into this mix an ineffective court system that is heavily influenced by politics,153 judges and people’s jurors who are carefully handpicked by the State’s
head political party, rulings that can be swayed and are not decided on proper
bases, and the detained protestors face a perfect storm.
IV. THE GLOBAL IMPACT AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
In isolation, the current law and the Vietnamese government’s treatment
of peaceful protestors seem to have affected only the Vietnamese people.
However, in this era of globalization, all nations are connected to, and their
actions have effects on, each other, and Vietnam is no exception.
The first and perhaps most direct scenario arises when a citizen of a different country gets involved in peaceful protesting in Vietnam. For instance,
William Nguyen, an American citizen from Houston, Texas, was arrested and
held in jail for “disturbing the peace” when he participated in a demonstration
against an economic zone proposal that would promote Chinese

150

Quinn, supra note 24, at 229, 230.
Id.
152
Lipes, supra note 149 (noting that no cases related to national security have ever been
reviewed by the Supreme Court after the appellate courts upheld the initial ruling).
153
Some scholars have adopted a so-called “instrumentalist” view of the Vietnamese legal system, which acknowledges the existence of a body of law but argues that the socialist
states “have promulgated law as a tool for political control.” Bui Ngoc Son, The Law of
China and Vietnam in Comparative Law, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 135, 139 (2017). Regarding the legal system in Vietnam, Professor Nicholson has commented that the Vietnamese
court is “concurrently a legal and political institution,” bound by law but must resolve issues under the party-state’s influence. Id. at 179.
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investments.154 Vietnam has since deported Nguyen,155 but not before airing
a videoclip of his admission to a violation of Vietnamese laws and his promise
not to “join any anti-state activities anymore.”156 Another American citizen,
Michael Nguyen, was detained in July 2018 pending investigation of charges
of “activity against the People’s government” without the ability to see family
or lawyers.157 It is entirely possible that the government did not know Michael
was a foreigner, as officials “frequently detained human rights activists upon
their return from overseas trips.”158 While it is problematic for peaceful protestors to be arbitrarily arrested, American citizen protestors, unlike their Vietnamese counterparts, still have a remedy at their disposal—reliance on the
U.S. government to take actions.159
The second scenario manifests itself in the form of international responses.
In 1977, Vietnam became a member state of the United Nations.160 The international organization drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) in 1948, which set out “fundamental human rights to be universally
protected.”161 Furthermore, in 1982, Vietnam acceded to the International
154

Hannah Ellis-Petersen, U.S. Calls on Vietnam to Release American Citizen Arrested
in Protests, GUARDIAN (June 15, 2018), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/u
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2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44896125.
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Vietnam: U.S. Citizen in Televised “Confession”, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 18,
2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/18/vietnam-us-citizen-televised-confession.
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FREE ASIA (Aug. 2, 2018), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/detained-080220181
64508.html.
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U.S. STATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 9.
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See Roxana Kopetman, American from Orange County Detained in Vietnam Prison;
Congresswoman Threatens “Consequences”, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Aug. 3, 2018), http://w
ww.ocregister.com/2018/08/02/american-from-so-cal-detained-in-vietnam-prison-congre
sswoman-threatens-consequences/ (citing support for Nguyen from the county congresswoman who “will go as high as [she has] to,” and from other representatives); see also
Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Vietnam Jails Two Americans for 14 Years for Trying to “Overthrow State”, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2018), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/2
4/vietnam-jails-two-americans-for-14-years-for-trying-to-overthrow-state (citing U.S. embassy’s statement regarding continued advocacy and support for two Americans who had
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(last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),162 a multilateral treaty monitored by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) which
commits its state parties to fifty-three articles regarding human rights.163 In
2014, Vietnam appeared before the United Nations Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and accepted 182 out of 227 recommendations from UN member
countries.164 The government has done little to honor its commitment—in
some cases, such as detaining dissident journalists, it has made the situation
even worse.165
Since all UN members have “pledged themselves to achieve . . . the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,”166 acts or conducts by any nation which deviate from that
standard understandably trigger reactions from the UNHRC. It is important to
note that these treaties and standards, without a formal enforcement authority,
are more or less “soft law mechanisms.”167 What this means is that a designated global institution, here the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention (WGAD), normally reviews a case, evaluates whether it is consistent with the norms articulated in UDHR and ICCPR, and then “advocates
to encourage governments to implement its [non-binding] recommendation.”168
As an illustration, in 2003, Dr. Nguyen Dan Que was arrested after sending
out a statement via email criticizing the government’s claim to guarantee freedom of information and at the same time endorsing the “Freedom of Information in Vietnam Act” introduced in the U.S.169 He was charged with possession and distribution of materials which contained “anti-Vietnam
162

Depository Status of Treaties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND
(last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
163
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information” in violation of Article 80 of the Penal Code, potentially facing a
long prison sentence or even death.170 Freedom Now, a non-profit, non-governmental advocacy organization, petitioned to the WGAD’s “Urgent Action”
procedure.171 The Working Group, in its opinion in September 2004, found
that Dr. Que’s actions were a valid exercise of freedom of opinion and expression, which is recognized in both article 19 of UDHR and article 19 of
ICCPR,172 “to which Viet Nam is a party.”173 Therefore, deeming such an arrest arbitrary and in contravention with the international norms and principles,
the Working Group proposed that Vietnam take actions to comply with the
two agreements.174
A fascinating development in this case was the significant advocacy and
involvement from the international community. Before the opinion of the
WGAD, twelve Nobel Laureates sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Vietnam
urging the release of Dr. Que,175 followed by his brother’s article “Freedom
For Vietnam, Freedom For My Brother,” describing the circumstances of the

170
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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/detention/pages/complaints
.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
172
See UDHR, supra note 161, at art. 19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
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arrest,176 and another letter from fifteen RFK Human Rights Award Laureates
petitioning for his release to the Prime Minister and the President of Vietnam.177 Notwithstanding the inaction from the government after the WGAD
opinion, U.S. lawmakers joined in the efforts with a letter from forty-two Congress members and a second letter from twelve Senators, both criticizing the
government’s treatment of Dr. Que and emphasizing the “unnecessary irritant
in U.S.-Vietnam relations” caused by his detention.178 Against the continued
silence, nine human rights organizations, including Freedom Now and Amnesty International, wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations (and enclosed copies to several members of the Vietnamese government), requesting his intervention “to ensure Vietnam complies with all
relevant human rights instruments preventing arbitrary detention.”179 Shortly
afterward, Dr. Que was released from prison, albeit under constant police
watch.180 The WGAD opinion, along with tremendous efforts from a foreign
government (here, the United States) and various international organizations,
made the release of Dr. Que possible.
Vietnam’s lack of true freedom of speech protection has negatively impacted not only the human rights of its citizens, but also its international economy. The adoption of the 1992 constitution has enabled Vietnam’s transition
to an open-market economy and allowed for a more progressive relation with
the rest of the world.181 The development was further strengthened by the bilateral trade agreement with the United States in 2001, which was the “last
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step in a long reconciliation” between the two countries,182 and accession to
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2007.183 But how does the mistreatment of some individuals have a cross-borders effect? “Progress in development and on human rights goes hand in hand,”184 and the international
response to continued mistreatment demonstrates the cross-border effect. Foreign governments consider the issue of human rights violations during transactions and negotiations with other countries. For example, the EU-Vietnam
Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) was scheduled to be ratified in 2018, which
would drastically boost Vietnam’s economy by, among other ways, eliminating tariffs for exports to Europe.185 However, thirty-two members of the European Parliament decided to delay finalizing the deal due to “grave concerns”
and “serious doubts about the country’s stated commitment to respect human
rights.”186 Specifically, in their letter sent to the EU’s Trade Commissioner
Cecilia Malmstrom and High Representative Federica Mogherini, the members suggested that the EU should set out certain “human rights benchmarks”
for Vietnam to meet “before the EVFTA is submitted to Parliament for approval.”187 These benchmarks include the repeal of certain articles to conform
with the ICCPR, release of peaceful protestors, and revisions of the law on
cyber security, among others.188 Similarly, human rights groups have also
called on Australia to adamantly pursue these issues.189 Continuing from the
2017 Australia-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue where there were robust discussions on “a wide range of human rights issues,”190 in 2018, Australia emphasized concerns regarding “ongoing restrictions on civil and political
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rights” and “[the] arrest and detention of human rights activists,” following
the signing of the Strategic Partnership with Vietnam.191 Using the economic
carrot-and-stick to negotiate improvements on human rights is not a new tactic. It was, in fact, used effectively when Vietnam sought to join the WTO in
2007.192
On the flip side, changes in international economic policy and social politics may undermine improvements or efforts on activism in Vietnam. For instance, one of President Trump’s first acts in office was to withdraw from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).193 The rationale for the decision was that the
treaty was “hurt[ing] American manufacturing,” and that it “would be a bad
deal for American businesses, workers and taxpayers.”194 While there are certainly financial consequences stemming from this event, withdrawal by the
United States has freed the Vietnamese government from “conditions imposed
by the Obama administration to join the trade pact.”195 Moreover, it has also
reversed the dynamic of social movement that was growing in Vietnam, resulting instead in a large oppressive crackdown on activists and peaceful protestors.196 Vietnam’s ascension to the top five of the world’s biggest prisons
for journalists in 2017197 could be partially attributed to President Trump’s
open condemnation of the news media,198 which had already had a “trickle191
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v.au/news/media/Pages/australian-statement-on-the-15th-annual-australia-vietnam-huma
n-rights-dialogue.aspx.
192
See Pro-Democracy Dissident, Pham Hong Son, to Be Released Shortly, ASIA NEWS
(Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Pro-democracy-dissident,-Pham-HongSon,-to-be-released-shortly-7046.html (commenting that the release of a dissident after
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down consequence[] for state and local journalists,”199 and very likely encouraged conservative foreign governments to justify their arrests and detention
of dissidents.200
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The release of Dr. Que raises a hypothetical question, whether this could
be the remedy for the arrested and detained protestors. Since none of the currently available approaches in Vietnam’s legal system prove feasible, perhaps
gathering international aids is a feasible solution. This idea, however, is far
removed from reality for two reasons. First, the WGAD could only provide
non-binding recommendations in the form of opinions to the government and
does not have authority to impose sanctions for violations of UDHR or
ICCPR.201 While its contribution to Dr. Que’s release was in no way trivial, a
significant force that drove the decision was the collective pressure on Vietnamese government from the international community whose reaction was
likely invoked in the first place thanks to Dr. Que’s reputation as “one of Vietnam’s most renowned democracy activists.”202 In fact, he had received multiple human rights awards, including the Raoul Wallenberg Award and the
RFK Human Rights Award,203 the latter of which positioned him in the circle
of fellow RFK laureates. Put another way, his achievements have created a
unique reputation and exposure for him, one that could influence worldwide
movement. That is not the case for most detained protestors who are just everyday people without much connection or recognition, voicing their dissents
over injustice. Second, from a policy perspective, this approach is inefficient
and cumbersome, as it requires a large number of resources. As the case
demonstrated, in addition to the investigation by Freedom Now and WGAD,
twenty-seven laureates, more than fifty U.S. officials, and nine organizations
were involved in the course of one year.204 Dr. Que’s release was certainly
more the exception than the rule.
While international forces have proven to be effective in liberating detained peaceful protestors, such an approach cannot be relied on sustainably
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for another reason: Vietnam and its citizens have no control over what other
countries can and will do. Moreover, after the government acquiesces to diplomatic pressure and permits the releases, the protestors are often “exiled” and
have to seek refuge in a Western country.205 That choice, however, is not favored by someone who wants to stay and exact change in Vietnam,206 and
furthermore, a legal citizen should not have to pick between imprisonment or
asylum merely for exercising a constitutional right. Thus, some fundamental
changes in domestic law and policies are necessary.
The first proposal is an amendment to the right to counsel. Article 31 of
the Constitution provides that any person “who has been arrested, held in custody, [or] prosecuted . . . has the right to self-defend or to seek the assistance
of defense from lawyers[.]”207 Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to persons held in custody and similarly grants them the right to “defend
by themselves or ask other persons to defend them.”208 What is critically missing from both of these provisions is the timing of access to counsel. The normal practice in Vietnam following an arrest by the police is temporary detention pending an investigation,209 during which time the right to counsel is not
enforceable. This practice is in compliance with the law in Vietnam, and in
fact, is not exclusive to Vietnam. For example, in the U.S., where the right to
counsel is embedded in the Sixth Amendment,210 the Supreme Court has held
that a defendant only gains this right “at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him, ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’”211 In Moran v.
Burbine, the Supreme Court further clarified that the Sixth Amendment became effective “only when the government’s role shifts from investigation to
accusation” because “it is only then that the assistance of one versed in the
‘intricacies . . . of law’ is needed.”212 Although following the same approach,
it is less problematic in the U.S. than in Vietnam. The police in the United
States risk facing sanctions as well as a multitude of torts claims from an
American citizen who is detained unreasonably or for an unreasonable period
205
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of time without charges.213 As discussed above, this form of remedy is effectively not available for a Vietnamese detainee in Vietnam.214 Therefore, the
legislature should adopt an amendment enforcing the right to counsel after a
specified threshold of time in detention, regardless of whether the investigation has concluded or the nature of the charges. This proposal will ensure that
the defense counsel has sufficient time to prepare the case, and at the very
least, prevent extended incommunicado detention which has been all too prevalent.
The second proposal is the establishment of an independent oversight
agency. A perpetually lurking problem in these arrests is the wide discretion
that the police have in enforcing the law and the lack of paper trails and accountability. Local and county governments could impose a procedure mandating details of each arrest and investigation, which would later be subject to
review by an independent oversight agency. While the People’s Prosecutor is
the agency designed to limit the power of the government and review the legality of its action,215 this function is not effective in the case of detained
peaceful protestors due to vague statutory language and likely influence from
the Party, as analyzed elsewhere in the Note. An independent oversight
agency could assume the responsibilities of reviewing the arrest reports made
by the police, assessing the situations of the case, assigning counsel as necessary, and holding the government accountable in cases of abusing its power.
The selection step for the agency is vital. In order to be effective and independent, the members of the agency must be democratically elected and free
from influence from the CPV, unlike the selection of jurors.216 The election
could be held with all candidates who are not members of the CPV and whose
backgrounds are clearly established for lay people to consider in voting. This
proposal certainly faces stiff resistance since the government will be reluctant
to grant power to an agency without any CPV members.
The third proposal involves a fundamental change in the appointment and
election of judges. Since the appointment process occurs every five years in
the same cycle as the National Assembly, judges are often under pressure to
lobby for their reappointment217 as well as to decide some cases in certain
ways to avoid not being appointed at the end of their terms.218 Legislation that
amends the current law to extend the apportionment term for qualified judges
may, in the short run, alleviate this pressure. Vietnam could also adopt
213
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separate appointment and election processes for different levels of judges—
in particular, judges for the Supreme People’s Court enjoy lifetime tenure
while judges at lower courts are still subject to reelection process. This treatment is similar to the way Supreme Court justices are treated in the United
States.219 The rationale for this proposal is that, by completely eliminating the
need to seek approval for reelection, judges at the highest level can independently decide cases according to the law without outside influence and can
effectively provide guidance for judges in lower courts. On the other hand,
this proposal is still susceptible to the CPV’s influence of the appointment
process and may allow the Party state to have a lifetime control in the judicial
system. There is currently no fix to the situation, as even in the U.S. model a
political party circumvented the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice to
wait for an appointee that fit the party’s needs better.220
On the international front, other nations could be part of the solution by
delaying economic treaties and partnerships with Vietnam until human rights
protection and remedies are guaranteed. As discussed above, this proposal has
achieved some success. Another possible approach could be the revocation of
Vietnam’s membership in the United Nations if the Vietnamese government
does not take action to abide by the ICCPR standards for human rights, which
threatens to take away Vietnam’s access to the United Nations’ aid and assistance. This proposal may require the United Nations to apply such disciplines
uniformly to all of its members, thus risking resistance from other nations with
situations similar to Vietnam. However, the rapid change in the global environment and the increasing diplomatic demands for human rights from the
international community may be effective in driving these changes forward.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of Vietnam is the history of people fighting for freedom. The
establishment of the CPV serves as a reminder of that history and that the
government will do anything to preserve the leadership of the Party. To prevent any threat that may undermine the CPV’s power or possibly overthrow
the sovereign, regardless of how remotely plausible that threat may be, the
government has taken extreme measures, including censoring the media and
arbitrarily arresting and detaining peaceful protestors. Such measures have a
negative impact on the lives of Vietnamese citizens as well as other aspects
of the country and have invoked international responses. In order for Vietnam
219
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220
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to move forward and develop relations with other countries, it must take human rights issues, particularly freedom of speech, seriously. The adoption of
the first domestic proposal could provide a safeguarding remedy for the protestors who are already detained. The second domestic proposal would likely
face resistance or may even prove futile, but the continued international pressure will help push it forward. Other nations could play a vital role in effecting
these changes by employing a more decisive approach in economic negotiations with Vietnam, conditioning agreements on improvements in human
rights treatment and protection. Freedom of speech is a fundamental right, and
no other activists should have to face long-term imprisonment for exercising
that right like Le Dinh Luong.

